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Abstract (English) 
 
In this study it is examined whether the amount of Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) is affected by 
terrorism in three developed countries in Europe from a time series approach. The countries that are 
examined are France, Spain and the United Kingdom. The time period is 1975-2016 and the 
observations are annual. In previous literature there is evidence that terrorism should have an impact 
on FDI. FDI and terror are assumed to have a negative relation. The model that is used for this thesis 
is a VAR. Each model is specified into three different model specifications where the total-, national- 
and transnational amount of terrorist attacks is investigated. The VAR showed no significant result for 
terrorism affecting FDI.  
 
 
Abstrakt (Svenska) 
Syftet med denna uppsats är att undersöka om mängden utländska direktinvesteringar (FDI) påverkas 
av terrorism i tre europeiska länder. Frankrike, Spanien, och Storbritannien undersöks under 
tidsperioden 1975-2016. Studien är baserad på årliga observationer och är gjord utifrån ett 
tidsserieperspektiv. I tidigare forskning finns det resultat som tyder på att terrorism har en påverkan på 
inflödet av FDI. FDI och terror antas ha en negativ relation. Modellen som används i den här studien 
är VAR. Båda modellerna estimeras i tre olika modellspecifikationer med fokus på beroendevariabel 
total-, nationell- och transnationell mängd terrorism för att förklara FDI. Resultaten från VAR 
estimeringen menar på att terrorism inte har en signifikant påverkan på FDI. 
 
. 
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1. Introduction  
 
The start of the modern era concerning terrorism is the terrorist attack on the Twin Tower 11th of 
September 2001 in New York. Some of the terrorist attacks were of such a magnitude that the impact 
of the action could change the conditions of an industry in a region, for example the changes in the 
tourism and airplane industries after 9/11 (Enders & Sandler, 2011). Terrorism is an object for both 
political and economical matters. In this study the economical reasons will be in focus. The financial 
wealth of a country can be destroyed by terrorism. The reason being that terrorism makes the country 
more unsecure that can lead to instability. When a country become instable and unsecure the foreign 
investments will decrease (Rasheed & Tahir, 2012).  
 
This research could be relevant for policy makers since the inflows of Foreign Direct Investments 
(FDI) decrease in some European countries and FDI are considered an important determinant for 
economic growth (Gold, 2009). This research could also be useful for policy makers in their policy 
work against terror (Bandyopadhyay & Younas, 2014). In the analysis one could argue that the 
alternative cost for developed countries are relatively higher than for developing countries, since there 
is relatively more to destroy in developed countries.  
 
According to a survey done in 2004 by the international corporate investors, terrorism is rated as one 
as the most important determinant when deciding whether to invest or not invest in a foreign country 
(Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2008). Terrorism increase the insecurity and the costs of doing business, 
thereby the incentives for FDI in a specific country are lowered. An example of an increased cost of 
conduct business is expenditures regarding security (Bandyopadhyay, Sandler & Younas, 2014). This 
illustrates the importance of investigating if terrorism has an affect on FDI. 
 
This study aims to examine if terrorism actions affect the amount of investments the FDI inflows in 
three developed countries in Europe between 1975-2016. The countries that are examined in this 
thesis are France, Spain and the United Kingdom. These countries are considered to be some of the 
largest and most important economies within the European Union and have all suffered from 
terrorism, both transnational and national (Kollias, Papadamou & Arvantitis, 2013). The used 
definition of terrorist attacks in this thesis is included by bombings and assassinations. 
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The research question for this thesis is: Have terrorism has affected the inflow of FDI in France, Spain 
and the United Kingdom negatively during the period 1975-2016? The sub question is to examine if 
there is a difference from suffering of national terrorism or transnational terrorism. The dependent 
variable in the analysis is the inflow of FDI. The amount of terrorist attacks is the independent 
variable in focus. None of the estimated VAR regressions show significant impacts on FDI. 
 
This study is structured as followed. In the second section some useful background for the thesis is 
presented. In the following section the previous research within the area in stated. In section four the 
used data and the variables is presented. In section five the model approach is motivated.  Further on, 
the result will be presented in section six and will be followed by a discussion. At last, the study will 
be concluded in section eight. References and the appendices are attached in the end of the thesis. 
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2. Background 
 
In this section some useful background of why FDI is important and why it is interesting to 
investigate terrorism is provided. In the end a description of the recent history of terrorism in France, 
Spain and the United Kingdom (UK) is stated. 
 
2.1 Importance of FDI in developed countries 
The definition of FDI is an investment that aims to be a long-term investment in a foreign country. 
The business is either controlled by an unit in the invested country or is controlled via its resident in 
another country than the invested country. This type of investments should reflect the interest of at 
permanent interest in a country. FDI is considered to be one of the most important determinants of 
economic integration and is an important source of finance capital investments. Studies on FDI, both 
theoretical and empirical, conclude that FDI has a potential impact on economic growth. FDI is one of 
the most stable external sources of capital. If FDI is invested in a country this suggests that the 
country has a stable financial structure (Dellis, Sondermann & Vansteenkiste, 2017). It is more costly 
to invest in a country were the threat of terror is high, since it demands higher expenditures on 
security and since the insecurity is high (Gold, 2009).  
 
The total amount of FDI has grown strongly over the last decades. During the period of 1980-2014 
FDI has grown from 1 trillion U.S. dollar to 25 trillion U.S. dollar in the world, which is an increase 
from 6 percent of the world GDP to 33 percent of the world GDP. The European market is considered 
one of the most important markets concerning FDI. 20 percent of the global stock of FDI in 2015 was 
invested in countries within the European area. However FDI has declined in Europe during the last 
years, since the competition from different markets in the world has increased. Economic integration 
has rapidly increased in the world in the last decades, thereby the costs of doing business abroad have 
decreased and the opportunities of doing business have increased (Dellis et al, 2017). 
 
2.2 Terrorism 
One of the most important factors for a company to decide whether to invest or not in a foreign region 
is if there is any terrorism in the region or country (Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2008). If there is a high 
amount of terrorist attacks in a certain area it reduces the willingness to invest. Multinational 
companies find it less interesting to set up new plants in areas affected by terrorism, due to the 
insecurity and destabilisation that follows from regular terrorist attacks. There is empirical evidence 
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that when terrorism declined the FDI rise again, an example of this is Colombia (Bandyopadhyay & 
Younas, 2014). 
 
Terrorism could be a source of high direct costs for countries. Generally, the costs of a lonely terrorist 
attack are not large relatively to the whole economy. Terrorists would like a terrorist attack to have as 
high damage for the society that would affect as many people as possible. In some cases the economic 
effects of an action could be decaying for up to two and a half years after the terror attack (Gold, 
2009).  
 
It is common to distinguish national and transnational terrorism. National terrorism is home grown 
and is only between actors within the given country. The problem is considered as a homegrown 
problem for the society. This could imply that there are inequalities or political instability within a 
country. Transnational terrorism concerns at least two countries where the terror group is from another 
country than the terrorist attack is taking place. Transnational terrorism is characteristic to have a 
greater impact on marginal growth than national terror since it may discourage to invest in FDI 
(Sandler, 2013). Findings point out that the main reason why terror organizations grow in some 
countries are the limitations on political freedom and not poverty. Richer developed countries are 
generally good targets for transnational terror groups, since they have relatively more to loose 
relatively to developing countries. National terrorist attacks, could be argued, to be a consequence of a 
political environment or a specific situation within a country, such as native people fighting for their 
rights of their own land. Transnational attacks, on the other hand, are considered to be a cause of a 
more global issue. Terrorism can also become transnational when a domestic group expand into 
another nation. Another argument for how transnational terrorist attacks arise, is that national attacks 
encourage transnational attacks. This is because the country might be an easy target for the 
transnational groups since a country already have problems with terror and cannot protect themselves 
from it (Enders and Sandler, 2011).  
 
There is research that point out that national terror has a small impact on economic growth relatively 
to transnational terrorism. There are indications that transnational and national terrorism follow each 
other. If terrorist attacks are successful in a region the probability of more terrorist attacks could 
increase (2011:78). Research on transnational terror groups has been the focus for studies on terrorism 
in the modern era. After 2001 there has been a shift from terrorist attacks mainly being occurring in 
Europe to be more frequent in the Middle East and Asia instead. This indicates that there has been a 
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shift in the location of the most common terrorism targets, from high-income countries to low-income 
countries. It has been suggested that the reason behind the shift is that high-income countries have 
increased the homeland security. Overall, transnational terrorism has shifted to more low-income 
countries, which do not increase security when the risk of terrorism increases. Their benefit and cost 
trade off is different from high-income countries, since they have relatively less to lose in sense of 
damaged institutions (Enders & Sandler, 2011). 
 
2.3. Background of terrorism in France, Spain and the United Kingdom 
The countries that are in focus for this study, have suffered significantly from terrorism. The terrorist 
attacks have been both national and transnational. In fact, among the countries in Western Europe, 
these countries have suffered the most from national terrorism. During the last 30 years, attacks 
performed by national separatist groups have caused 3600 fatalities in Northern Ireland (UK), 800 for 
the Basque Country (Spain) and around a dozens in Corsica (France) (Sánchez, 2008). 
 
One of the most common terrorist groups that have been active in France is the Corsican separatist 
group Corsican National Liberation Front (FLNC). The FLNC was founded in 1976 and is mainly 
attacking individuals and infrastructure both on Corsica and on the mainland (Sánchez, 2008). 
 
The most common national terrorist groups in Spain are the “anti-capitalists” which have grown from 
radical left-wing ideologies. ETA which is the most occurring national terrorist group in Spain, was 
founded to promote the independence of the Basque point out and has been active since 1959. ETA 
operates in Spain as well as France. The terrorist conflict in the Basque Country has often been said to 
have a significant deterrence for both domestic terrorism and FDI in the region. Basque Country was 
in the late 1970’s one of the richest regions in Spain (Sánchez, 2008). There is evidence which states 
that the terrorist attacks in the Basque Country has caused a ten percentage points lower GDP per 
capita in comparison to other similar areas in Spain (Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2003). There is evidence 
that ETA harmed interests in investing in Spain, because Spain imposed a revolutionary tax, which 
have reduced expected returns on financial assets and thereby also would reduce the attraction of FDI 
(Enders & Sandler, 1996).  ETA is responsible for approximately 800 deaths during its active days. 
According to a trend report from European Police Office, concerning 2006, there were 498 reported 
terrorist attacks within the European Union. National separatists were responsible for 424 of these. 
136 out of these attacks were attacks performed by ETA. ETA mainly aim damage institutions, not to 
cause fatalities (Sánchez, 2008).  
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The most common group responsible for national terrorist attacks in is the Irish Republican Army 
(IRA), which have a long history of political actions that can be traced back to the 1930’s (Enders & 
Sandler, 2011).  
 
In this thesis the data of terror contains bombings and assassinations. The distribution between 
bombings and assassinations in France, Spain and the United Kingdom is attached in Appendix A. 
There is also illustrated how bombings and assassination for these given countries move during the 
time period. To see the different allocation for where the events in the countries have been most 
common, see the statistics in the Appendix B. 
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3. Previous research 
 
This section will present evidence for the impact of terrorism on FDI. These previous findings will 
then be connected to the findings in this thesis. The research concerning the economical effects of 
terrorism is carefully explored. Since the terrorist attack on World Trade Centre on 9/11, the research 
has been focused on transnational terrorism. The area within the terrorism’s impact on FDI is more or 
less unexplored. The results of the relation between terrorism and FDI are inconclusive (Powers & 
Choi, 2012). The existing research concerning the connection between FDI and terrorism in developed 
countries is limited and the existing research is mainly concerning developing countries.  
 
Enders and Sandler (1996) performed a study in 1996 where they examined the effects of 
transnational terrorist attacks on FDI in Spain and Greece. The study is often referred to in the 
research field. They examined whether the transnational terror in Spain and Greece between 1968-
1991 affected FDI. The study is based on quarterly data. Enders and Sandler listed four different 
economic costs related to terrorism. One of, these four cost, is the attacks at FDI plants, with the aim 
to bring investments down. They model Spain in an ARIMA-model and Greece in a VAR-model, 
which are the most suitable models for each country. The authors found significant and persistent 
decline in investments, which also will affect the country’s economic performance. The effect of the 
VAR was greater than the effects of the ARIMA-model. They conclude that there is a decline in FDI 
of approximately 10 percent in each country. This represented reductions of the annual fixed capital of 
around 8 percent for Spain and around 35 percent for Greece. Walter and Enders found that a typical 
terror event in Greece, during the given period, proved to have a reduction of 2,7 percent of the FDI. 
 
Enders, Sandler and Sachsida (2006) investigate to what extent the effect of the impacts caused by 
transnational terrorism against the U.S. has affected FDI. They point out that some terrorists want to 
negatively impact both the U.S. investors and the U.S. as a whole. 40 percent of all transnational 
terrorist attacks in the world targeted American-related interests. A majority of these attacks occur 
outside of the U.S. Enders et al applies both time-series and panel approaches. 69 countries are 
included in their study. First, they look into whether the 9/11 attacks have had long-term negative 
impact on the American FDI. Of the 69 countries in the study, Turkey was the only one that had the 
affects of a long-term negative impact. For all other countries, the attacks did not have any long-term 
impact on FDI. Thereafter, it was examined if the U.S. FDI stock invested abroad was reduced 
followed by transnational terrorist attacks. They find a small negative relation of the impact on FDI in 
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OECD countries. In their sample FDI was reduced all together by one percent and were the largest in 
Turkey and Greece, where FDI decreased by 5.7 percent units respectively 6.5 percent units. This 
result was true for the OECD countries but not for the non-OECD countries. 
 
The purpose of Choi and Powers (2012) is to examine whether transnational terrorism reduces FDI or 
not. They investigate 123 developing countries using a time series approach during 1980-2008.  Choi 
and Powers distinguish between business-related and non-business-related terrorism. They conclude 
that business-related terrorist attacks have a negative effect inflow of the FDI, while for the non-
business targets there where no effect. Choi and Powers imply a counterterrorism measure, which 
intend to directly decrease business-related terror. The effects of implying direct efforts to decrease 
business-targeted terrorism gives pay-off and it is more likely to attract FDI again, since the threat 
from terror is decreased. 
 
Abadie and Gardeazabul (2008) argue that terrorism have a large impact on investments. The study is 
made for 98 countries for the year 2003. The authors use a standard endogenous growth model in their 
research. They conclude that the risk of terror reduce the likelihood to invest in FDI. When the 
country struggles to keep stabile institutions and markets, foreign investors do not solely base their 
decision to invest or not on terrorism, but do also take the general stability of the country into account. 
The choice to invest or not in a country, is not exclusively depending on terrorism. The most 
important goal is to gain return on the invested capital. Abadie and Gardeazabul find that an increase 
in the standard deviation of a country’s terrorism would decrease FDI into a country with 
approximately five percent. Their results establish the fact that trade openness is the main reason of 
why terrorism would hurt an economy.  
 
Kollias, Papadamou and Arvanitis (2013) investigate the effects from terrorism on the stock-bond 
return, variance and covariance in France, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom. The data covers 
the period of 1988-2008. They make a distinction between national and transnational terror and look 
into possible difference between these. The four countries are argued to be relevant since they have 
been significant victims of terrorism, which includes both national and transnational terrorism. The 
models used to explain this are VAR and GARCH-in-mean models. They are able to conclude that the 
amount of terrorist attacks is slightly bigger in France and Germany, than in Spain and. Both types of 
terror activities least affected the stock-bond market in the United Kingdom, but the effect of 
transnational terrorist attacks is larger than national terrorism. In Spain they could only find 
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significant evidence in case of the national terror, while the effects of transnational terror could only 
be found in France and Germany. The authors concluded that national terror is more likely to make 
the market volatile since it is connected to political instability. However, they also conclude that 
transnational terrorism had a spillover effect of other conflicts in areas around the world. 
 
Blomberg, Hess and Orphanides (2004) found that transnational attacks have a small negative 
influence on economic growth. This was true in OECD countries, but not in non-OECD countries. 
Their study includes 177 countries between 1960-2000. They use cross sectional, panel approach and 
VAR-model to test for the dynamic interactions between transnational terrorism and long-run 
macroeconomic consequences. They point out that terrorism have a negative significant effect on the 
investment ratio, which is not true for other types of conflicts. Blomberg et al can conclude that 
transnational terrorism has on average a negative impact on economical growth. Further on they find 
evidence that the appearance of external and internal conflicts in a country increase the probability of 
terrorist attacks. This implies that the presence of internal conflict tends to attract other conflicts into a 
country, such as terrorism. 
 
To summarize, there is evidence in the previous literature, which point out that there is evidence that 
terrorism has an impact on the inflow of FDI. In some of the cases its noted that the suffering from 
decreased FDI could be large when a country is suffer from terrorism, and in some cases its been 
proven that the decrease has a long-term effect.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________	
 
4. Data  
 
In this section the data used in the analysis will be presented. Additionally, the explanatory variable 
GDP is presented and explained. 
 
4.1 FDI and terrorism 
This thesis is focused on France, Spain and the United Kingdom during the period 1975-2016. The 
data is expressed in annual observations. The data for net inflow of FDI was downloaded from The 
World Bank, and is provided in current U.S. dollar. The data collected concerning terrorism was 
downloaded from Global Terrorism Database (GTD). This is the most common database for the field 
of terrorism.  
 
The definition of terror differs a lot in previous studies, but in this thesis it includes bombings and 
assassinations. Bombings is by far the most standard type of terrorist actions and can take various 
forms. Assassinations has often has political motives (Enders & Sandler, 2011). 
 
In order to qualify as a terrorist attack, an attack must fulfil three criteria, which were optional when 
downloading the data. The first criterion is that the act must be aimed at a goal, which can be social, 
political, economic or religious. The second criterion is that there must be evidence that the act had 
the intent to scare, force or transfer a message to a larger audience than the suffered victims. The third 
criterion is that the action must be outside the frames of legitimate warfare. In other words, the attacks 
have to be outside the frames of international humanitarian laws. All ambiguous and unsuccessful 
terrorist events are excluded from the sample. The terrorist attacks are divided into national and 
transnational observations. For total number of terror attacks: national, transnational and unknown 
terrorist attacks are included. The number of national terrorist attacks includes all acts performed by 
national terror groups. The number of transnational terrorist attacks includes all terrorist acts 
performed by transnational terror groups. To distinguish the data into national and transnational 
terrorism the method that Enders and Sandler (2011) used is applied.  
 
The definition of national terrorism is when the attack is homegrown and the perpetrator group is from 
the country. Terror groups that perform transnational attacks do generally not intend to scare their 
home countries. If the target of the action is a non-governmental organization, the attack will be 
considered as a transnational. If the group is connected to an international ideology such as Nazism, 
the group is also considered transnational (Enders & Sandler, 2011). In order to decide whether a 
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terrorist attack is national or transnational, GTD is used, as well as the website Inside Gov. Inside Gov 
is an American search engine within political and governmental issues. In appendix C there is a 
register of all known terror groups in the sample and how these are defined terror groups.  All 
observations from 1993 in the GTD dataset are missing. To solve this problem, the data for 1993 is 
interpolated by taking the mean value of the amount of terrorism for 1992 and 1994. The same 
method is applied to create values for 1993’s allocation between the national, transnational and 
unknown terrorist attacks. 
 
4.2 Explanatory variable for FDI 
For explaining FDI one of the most common used variable is GDP. This is one of the most common 
variable in analyses both developed and developing countries. Nominal GDP is used as a proxy for 
market size (Economou, Hassapis, Philippas & Tsionas, 2017). The data for GDP is downloaded from 
OECD database and is expressed in current U.S. dollar. GDP is assumed to have a positive correlation 
to FDI. The larger the market of investment is connected with larger potential demand and lower costs 
because of scale economics (Walsh & Yu, 2010).  
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5. Empirical strategy 
 
In this section the model approach will be presented. The chosen model for this study is a VAR. The 
model will include FDI, terrorism and GDP. The model will be used for three different specifications 
of terrorism: total, national and transnational terrorism. 
 
The VAR model is the most common one to be used in models with stochastic time series. The model 
is built upon that the variables that explain FDI, for this case, are explained by the same determinants. 
The model tests the dynamics between the variables with help from the processes history. The error 
terms are assumed to be independent of FDI, terrorism and GDP. But they are allowed to have error 
terms that correlated among the variables (Verbeck, 2012). The VAR is considered to be very useful 
when exploring the interrelationships among a set of variables (Enders and Sandler, 1996).  
 
When taking previous research into account, the most proper model approach for a study like this is a 
VAR. Enders and Sandler (1996) use a VAR to check whether terrorism affects the inflow of FDI in 
Greece. Their findings imply that transnational terrorism and FDI demonstrated response of 
interrelations, and found that there were significant results for a negative impact of terrorism on FDI. 
Kollias et al (2013) use a VAR when exploring the relation between terrorism and stock-bond market 
returns in France, Spain and the United Kingdom. They highlight that terrorism could cause effects, 
which would probably have a high affect on markets. In Blomberg et al (2004), a VAR is used to 
interpret the macroeconomic consequences between terrorism, internal conflicts and external wars. 
The VAR is used in previous research to investigate the affect of terrorism in similar studies and is 
thereby a proper model to use in this thesis. 
 
The process of finding the right model specification was broad-based with support from previous 
studies. Different models and model specifications have been tested in this analysis. For example an 
OLS was made but the results was very misleading according to our expectations about the sign of the 
explanatory variables. Examples of tested explanatory variables for example FDI are trade openness, 
exchange rate, and unit labour costs. The model specifications were done in different combinations. 
The most effective explanatory variable to use was GDP. The in the end chosen VAR model includes 
FDI, terrorism and GDP is elected, since it lowest AIC and SC for all countries. AIC and SC is a 
measure for how well the data fits the model. The lower the AIC and SC value a regression, the better 
the model specification is. To be able to choose a proper lag length, which also would be the most 
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proper for all countries, a “lag length criteria” test is made. The most proper common lag length for all 
countries is to choose three lags. The result of the lag length test is attached in Appendix E.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
		
			 19	
6. Results 
 
Firstly, in this section, descriptive statistics for terrorism and FDI will be submitted. Further on, tests 
for unit roots and correlation between the variables will be stated. Lastly the results of the VAR 
regression will be presented in Impulse Response Functions (IRF).  
 
6.1 Descriptive statistics  
In table 2 the number of total terror-, national, transnational- and unknown terrorist attacks are pointed 
out. The quantity of total terrorist attacks is similar for the countries in the study. The largest amount 
of attacks is provided by national terrorism. Note that the quantity of unknown terrorist attacks are a 
relatively big part of the total amount, and that transnational terrorist attacks are relatively a small part 
to the total. For France, unknown terrorist attacks stand for as large as one third of all terrorist attacks. 
For Spain and the United Kingdom the number of unknown terrorist attacks are about 15 percent. In 
Spain, the number of all terrorist attacks is a considerable quantity of the total number of terrorist 
attacks. 
 
Table 1. Quantity of terrorism 
 
Country Total National Transnational Unknown 
France 2027 1214 128 685 
Spain 1964 1601 71 292 
The United Kingdom 1900 1507 168 225 
 
 
Figures 1-6 illustrate how terrorist attacks and FDI develop over time in France, Spain and the United 
Kingdom during the time period. The general pattern is that the quantity of terrorist attacks has 
decreased over time. For France the number of terrorist attacks is volatile, and could be considered as 
more of a stable decline in Spain and the United Kingdom. The amount of terrorist attacks has 
decreased and has been quite low since around 2000 for all countries. During the same time as the 
quantity of terrorist attacks decreased FDI boomed. During the global financial crisis during 2008-
2012 the FDI inflow declined for all countries, which revitalized for last years of the sample.  
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Figure 1. Terrorism in France 1975-2016 
 
 
	
 
 
Figure 2. FDI in France 1975-2016 
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Figure 3. Terrorism in Spain 1975-2016 
 
 
 
	
 
 
 
Figure 4. FDI in Spain 1975-2016 		
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Figure 5. Terrorism in the United Kingdom 1975-2016 
 
 
 
 
	
 
 
Figure 6. FDI in the United Kingdom 1975-2016 
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6.2 Unit root 
To find the model approach, I begin by testing the variables for unit roots. The errors of the processes 
have a mean that is zero and the variances need to be finite. If the regression is made with variables 
that have a unit root, the result could prove significant result, even though it is not significant. This 
means that the variable is trending during the time period. If the variable is I(1), which we assume for 
the set of variables, they will be recreated by first differencing and the variable will thereby become 
stationary. For the purpose the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test is performed. The null 
hypothesis for the test is that there is no unit root. In table 2 the results for the ADF test is illustrated. 
 
Table 2. Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test  
 
Variable France, Spain UK 
FDI -2.90 -4.63*** -3.46** 
∆ FDI -7.45*** -5.58*** -7.16*** 
Terrorist attacks -4.67** -4.5*** -4.18** 
National attacks -5.28*** -4.10** -3.61** 
Transnational attacks -4.20** -6.70*** -5.72** 
GDP -1.43 -2.41 -1.19 
∆  GDP -5.38*** -2.69 -6.32*** 
 
 
FDI and GDP have a unit root for at least one country. For these variables the first differencing is 
made. We see that all the variables are stationary after differencing, except for GDP in Spain. 
Terrorism appears to be stationary. This is true for all types of terrorist attacks. 
 
6.3 Correlation 
To see the correlation between the different variables, correlation matrices are made for the countries 
in order to see how the variables correlate with each other.  The variable “unknown” terror is 
presented in the tables, even though it is not modelled into none of the regression. It is presented in the 
to see how this quantity of terrorism stands for itself in comparision to the other variables. The 
correlation matrices for France, Spain and the United Kingdom are stated below in tables 3-5. 
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Table 3. Correlation matrix for France 
 
		
 
Table 4. Correlation matrix for Spain 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Correlation matrix for The United Kingdom 
 
	
 
 
 
In general the correlations for France, Spain and the United Kingdom are relatively similar. The 
correlations between FDI in first difference and total amount of terrorist attacks in Spain and France 
have a positive relation. The assumption of the relation between FDI and total terrorism is thereby 
false for two out of three countries. The correlation for Spain is 0.7 percent and France 1.1 percent. In 
The United Kingdom the relation is negative with 9 percent. Correlation between total terrorism and 
national is high for all countries, since the share of national time is high of the total quantity of 
terrorist attacks.  
 
Since the amount of data is divided into national, transnational and unknown, we can see how these 
specific terrorism variety correlates with FDI. The correlation between the total amount terrorism and 
the amount of national terrorism is highly correlated, since most of the terrorist attacks are defined as 
national terrorist attacks. The relation between the total amount of terror and transnational terrorism in 
Correlation Δ FDI total terror national transnat unknown Δ GDP
Δ FDI 1.000000
total terror 0.011805 1.000000
national 0.011713 0.899854 1.000000
transnational 0.069030 0.426075 0.412407 1.000000
unknown -0.004908 0.754566 0.402875 0.123409 1.000000
Δ GDP 0.376530 -0.374024 -0.347418 -0.203668 -0.258305 1.000000
FRANCE
Correlation Δ FDI total terror national transnat unknown Δ GDP
Δ FDI 1.000000
total terror 0.007394 1.000000
national 0.014991 0.987313 1.000000
transnational -0.003218 0.514471 0.426674 1.000000
unknown -0.026526 0.790048 0.709913 0.339853 1.000000
Δ GDP 0.394847 -0.225086 -0.223005 -0.092179 -0.188732 1.000000
UK
Correlation Δ FDI total terror national transnat unknown Δ GDP
Δ FDI 1.000000
total terror -0.094620 1.000000
national -0.097473 0.989604 1.000000
transnational -0.063590 0.718475 0.649645 1.000000
unknown 0.023144 0.041451 -0.053164 -0.105356 1.000000
Δ GDP 0.414844 -0.371814 -0.384079 -0.313040 0.186822 1.000000
Correlation Δ FDI total terror national transnat unknown Δ GDP
Δ FDI 1.000000
total terror 0.007394 1.000000
national 0.014991 0.987313 1.000000
transnational -0.003218 0.514471 0.426674 1.000000
unknown -0.026526 0.790048 0.709913 0.339853 1.000000
Δ GDP 0.394847 -0.225086 -0.223005 -0.092179 -0.188732 1.000000
Correlation Δ FDI total terror national transnat unknown Δ GDP
Δ FDI 1.000000
total terror 0.011805 1.000000
national 0.011713 0.899854 1.000000
transnational 0.069030 0.426075 0.412407 1.000000
unknown -0.004908 0.754566 0.402875 0.123409 1.000000
Δ GDP 0.376530 -0.374024 -0.347418 -0.203668 -0.258305 1.000000
FRANCE
Correlation Δ FDI total terror national transnat unknown Δ GDP
Δ FDI 1.000000
total terror 0.007394 1.000000
national 0.014991 0.987313 1.000000
transnational -0.003218 0.514471 0.426674 1.000000
unknown -0.026526 0.790048 0.709913 0.339853 1.000000
Δ GDP 0.394847 -0.225086 -0.223005 -0.092179 -0.188732 1.000000
UK
Correlation Δ FDI total terror national transnat unknown Δ GDP
Δ FDI 1.000000
total terror -0.094620 1.000000
national -0.097473 0.989604 1.000000
transnational -0.063590 0.718475 0.649645 1.000000
unknown 0.023144 0.041451 -0.053164 -0.105356 1.000000
Δ GDP 0.414844 -0.371814 -0.384079 -0.313040 0.186822 1.000000
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the United Kingdom has a correlation as high as 72 percent. The same relation is visible for France 
and Spain, 42 respectively 51 percent. In the United Kingdom FDI correlate negatively with 
transnational terrorism with about 6 percent.  
 
In all countries terrorism and GDP have a high negative correlation. This is consistent with the 
findings that terrorism has an affect on GDP. For France and the United Kingdom, GDP and total 
quantity of terror negatively correlate as high as 37 percent. In Spain it is negatively correlated with 
23 percent. 
 
6.4 VAR  
In this subsection, the Impulse Response Functions (IRF) provides the results for the VAR 
regressions. The IRFs are presented in figure 7-15. An IRF estimate a shock of two and a half 
standard deviation and has a 100 percent error bands. The column of each figure is the dynamic 
response of the row variables. For example in the top row we see how the shock of FDI with a two 
and a half standard deviation on FDI, total terror, and GDP. The box of main interest in each figure, is 
in the middle on the top row, how FDI response to a shock of terrorism.  
 
Figure 7. Impulse Response Function for total terrorism in France 
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Figure 8. Impulse Response Function for national terrorism in France 
 
Figure 9. Impulse Response Function for transnational terrorism France  
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The shocks of total terrorist attacks and national terrorist attacks affects FDI relatively the same in 
Spain. In the graphs, a decrease in FDI occurs for period two. Thereby there is no immediate response 
to the shock. A shock from total terrorism or national terrorism would decrease FDI with 
approximately 2 billions U.S. dollar in the period. In period four, the shock responds positively to 
FDI. This positive respond has a larger peak than the negative one and exists for nearly two and a half 
period. The affect of the shock has died out has died out in period five, concerning the case of total 
terrorism and national terrorism. The shock of transnational terrorism is more absent over time. The 
transnational impact on FDI has the same negative impact as national and total terrorism has on FDI. 
Though the shock appears one period after, in period three instead of two. The result on how terrorism 
affects FDI is in the beginning in line with the assumption. The results for total terrorism and national 
terrorism has however a strong positive outcome after the negative shock. 
 
As was stated in the correlation matrix figure 3, GDP had a negative relatively large correlation with 
terrorism. The box in the bottom in the middle is now of interest. The shocks of total terrorism and 
national terrorism immediate affect GDP negatively and have a longer existence before it goes back to 
normal situation.  The shock occurs until period four. The immediate loss of GDP measures up to 
approximately 20 000 U.S. dollars. The shock of transnational terrorism to GDP persists during the 
whole sample, but is of a smaller magnitude than for total terrorism and national terrorism. 
Figure 10. Impulse Response Function for total terrorism in Spain 
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Figure 11. Impulse Response Function for national terror in Spain 
 
 
Figure 12. Impulse Response Function for transnational terror in Spain 
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The effects for a shock of terrorism for FDI in Spain are not in line with the assumption of how 
terrorism affects FDI. The shock of terror has at first a positive affect regarding the inflow of FDI. 
This positive effect occurs in period two and has died out in period four for all the IRFs. The positive 
affects are more visible in the result for total terrorism and national terrorism. The affects are 
approximately around 2 billion U.S dollars in each case. After the positive shock, in the total and 
national case, it is followed by a negative result that remains to the seventh period. The peak of the 
negative shock is more or less as big as the positive outcome, around two billion U.S. dollar, but 
occurs during a longer period. The response of transnational terror to FDI in Spain is relatively small 
in comparison. The shocks appears to have to have smaller durability and appears around the zero, 
thereby the transnational shock to FDI appears to be smoother. 
 
Concerning the terrorist shocks of GDP the shock of a two and a half standard deviation of terrorism 
first appears to be positive and exists to period four for total terrorism and national terrorism. The 
positive shock is followed by a negative shock that exists for the rest of the samples. The negative 
shock is less than 10 000 U.S dollars. The response of a transnational terrorist shock in GDP moves 
around the zero. It is hard to distinguish the shocks movement through the sample. It can thereby be 
concluded that the affects of transnational terrorism to GDP is not large. 
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Figure 13. Impulse Response Function for total terrorism in the United Kingdom 
 
 
Figure 14. Impulse Response Function for national terrorism in the United Kingdom 
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Figure 15. Impulse Response Function for transnational terrorism in the United Kingdom 
 
 
The result in the United Kingdom concerning total and national terrorism, the pattern of the shock is 
relatively the same as in the results for France. The shock appears in period three, which is one period 
after Spain, and die out in period four. The negative response in FDI is approximately about 1 billion 
U.S. dollars. There is a smaller increase of a positive reaction in the FDI in period four, than to the 
results of France. But since the axis is high numerated it is hard to distinguish how large the shock is. 
The shock of transnational terrorism to FDI is quite alike to the transnational shock in France. 
However the confidence interval in the United Kingdom case gets wider the longer the time goes. In 
the France case the confidence interval is bigger in the beginning and become narrower the longer the 
time goes. 
 
The confidence interval for all three IRFs is concerning GDP has a negative shock which appears 
directly. Broadly all three estimations have the same structure. All shocks move under the normal 
state for all periods, but the effect decays more the longer the time go. The confidence intervals have a 
form of a horn, which means that the estimations for these are more insecure the longer the time goes. 
The strongest response to a shock in GDP is the transnational one, it has an immediate negative effect 
by 8 000 U.S dollars. 
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To summarize the results of the VAR, the shocks are not persistent through the whole simulation. The 
shocks have both positive and negative response to a shock of FDI. The eventual negative effect in the 
beginning is relatively short, but could hurt a country properly. According to the simulations the 
effects of the simulations are more dramatic concerning the terrorisms impact on FDI, since the 
amount of a loss is high. A two and a half standard deviation shock of terrorism could cause a loss of 
FDI around billions current U.S. dollars. In Spain the shocks firstly have a positive impact on FDI and 
are thereby followed by a decrease in the inflow of FDI. The results thereby differ between the 
countries, but the losses of FDI could lead to a huge loss. Concerning the GDPs response to a shock of 
terrorism, the results show a more persistent negative shock. This since the shocks nearly only moves 
under the zero. The effects of the GDP are smaller. None of the results for the VAR model is 
significant, since none of them appears outside the confidence intervals.  
 
6.5 Causality test 
As a part of the VAR-analysis the Granger Causality test is made. The Granger Causality test is made 
to check whether terrorism and the inflow of FDI have causality. A Granger Causality test can have 
four different outcomes; FDI has causation on terrorism, terrorism has causation on FDI, none of the 
variables causes each other or the both variables cause each other. It is performed for each of the 
countries and a test is done for each of the three investigated types of terror: total, national and 
transnational amount of terrorism. For France FDI granger cause total terror and national terror at 
significance of 5 percent. For Spain FDI and total terror cause each other in both direction at 
significance of 10 percent. FDI and national terror in Spain also cause each other in both directions at 
the same significance level. The Granger Causality test shows no significant causality for the United 
Kingdom. The significant results of the Granger Causality tests are presented in Appendix D. 
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7. Discussion 
 
In this section the result of previous section will be discussed. The analysis will be connected to 
previous research and possible explanations of the weak results will be stated.  
 
Terrorism has according to this thesis no significant economic impact concerning FDI. The outcomes 
of the estimations differs among the countries and a shock of terrorism has not a consistent impact on 
FDI, since the shocks appears to be both negative and positive in the simulation. Terrorism seem to 
have a more consistent impact on GDP, since most of the simulations had a negative effect through 
the whole simulation. 
 
The result for this thesis is different from the results that are stated in the section with previous 
studies. One could wonder why this result differs from the ones that is stated in the section of previous 
literature. One reason of the different results could be that the patterns of FDI for developed countries 
and terrorism are more complex than the fit of the data with combination of a quite small sample. One 
possible idea of why terrorism seemingly has no impact on the FDI, during the time period 1975-2016 
in these three countries, is that the terrorist attacks are taking place in different places of the country 
and therefore does not hurt the economical standard in the country (see appendix B). Up to 
approximately the half of all terrorist attacks in each country took place in other parts than the sixth 
most common places for terrorist attacks. For terrorism to have an actual negative impact on FDI it is 
important that the attacks target the same place and are frequent enough to damage the country’s 
economic standard and are even more important to strike the country’s economic heart. This since it 
could be argues that these centres are clusters of foreign investors and the place where international 
affairs are settled.  On relatively big markets the economy might have the possibility to shift location 
or direction of its operation, and thereby not hurt the inflow of FDI. The foreign investors invest in 
other regions than the given area that suffers from terrorism. National terrorist attacks, which are by 
far the largest part of all terrorist attacks, could also be considered as quite local and therefore not a 
threat to the whole economy.  
 
Another reason why terrorism does not have an impact on FDI is that FDI is the wrong type of 
investment to consider. This since FDI cannot absorb the short-lasting effects of terrorism. Therefore 
other types of investment, which are more volatile, absorb the effect of terrorism in a better way. 
Further on, another argument for the different result for this thesis could be that these countries might 
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be considered as such attractive markets that the threat of terrorism does not matter. According to 
Kollias et al (2013) these countries are the most important economies within Europe, and could 
therefore be independent of the terrorism impact on FDI. The foreign investors are willing to invest in 
these countries anyway. This could be true for at least Spain, since terrorism seem to have a positive 
impact on FDI in the beginning.  
 
Even though the VAR regressions show insignificant results, it cannot be eliminated that terror and 
FDI has an impact on each other.  The results of Granger Causality implications on that FDI and 
terrorism cause one another. The Granger Causality test regarding the terrorism and FDI for France 
and Spain is significant. Since amount of national terror is a large part of the total quantity of terrorist 
attacks these give the same results concerning how these causal react to FDI. In France, FDI causal 
react to total and national terror. In Spain FDI and national terrorism and total terror goes both 
directions; the FDI causal react to terrorism and terrorism casual react to FDI. When FDI has causality 
to terrorism, which is the opposite to the hypothesis of the thesis, this could indicate that the terror 
attack has been minded to attack business targets. This would then be in line with the results by Choi 
and Powers (2012). When FDI increases the displeasure within different national groups might grow 
and they take action to show their discontent via targeting these establishments and plants. For 
example, this is coherent with the terrorism in Spain, since the national terror groups are considered to 
be “anti-capitalists”. This could be especially true for the terror group ETA, since they mostly have 
targeted buildings and institutions.  
 
The research within the area for FDI and terror might be skewed since authors would have incentives 
to only publish research that have significant results which points out that terrorism affects FDI 
negatively. This might be an answer because the fear of terror has grown after 9/11 and transnational 
terrorism has been in focus for studies. The findings of insignificant results could have an interesting 
importance for political decision-making, since the decreasing trend of investing in FDI in Europe 
seem to be a fact, and the inflows of FDI indicates to have a big impact on the economic growth. It is 
further on important to have a consistent approach of how to define terrorism, in order to get fair and 
comparable results.  In the sample of this thesis national terrorism is exclusive the biggest part of the 
total terrorism, thereby one could argue that the focus within the research field is wrong. In the 
European context this argument become stronger when concerning the fact that transnational terrorism 
has shifted from the Western World and become more frequent in Middle East and Asia. This would 
encourage further research within national terrorism.  
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8. Conclusion 
  
This thesis aimed to investigate the impact of terrorism on FDI in France, Spain and the United 
Kingdom for the time period 1975-2016. These countries have experienced a significant occurrence of 
both national and transnational terrorism during the given time period. The sub research question is if 
there was a difference in impact of national and transnational terrorism. The estimated model is a 
VAR that included FDI, terrorism and GDP for three lags. This study cannot find any significant 
evidence for the statement that terrorism have an affect on FDI during the time period, though there is 
evidence in previous studies that there is an impact. The Granger Causality tests state significant 
results for that there is causality between terrorism and FDI in France and Spain. Even though the 
VAR regressions show insignificant results, it cannot be eliminated that FDI has causality with total 
terrorism and national terrorism.  
 
The result for national terrorism in this thesis could be considered as an important result since the 
previous literature, concerning the transnational terrorism, portray transnational terror as the most 
dangerous one and that this has been the focus of the research area. One should also have in mind that 
the results within the area of terrorism are inconsistent.  
 
One of the most difficult issues within the subject of terrorism is that the definition is inconvenient, 
and therefore the results of the research are hard to compare. For the future, the field it would have its 
advantages to have a consistent definition of terrorism, since the previous literature lacks of it. The 
researches outcome might differ when the sample of countries and the definition of terrorism and the 
frequency of the data is different. 
 
The literature concerning the costs of terrorism is large, but its relation of FDI concerning the 
developed countries, within Europe especially, is fairly limited. The overall evidence of previous 
research is ambiguous this gets even more important.  For further research it would be preferable to 
build upon previous studies to be able to conclude whether the deduction within previous research is 
having significant results for an accident or not. According to the survey in 2014 one of the largest 
determinants to investment in FDI is whether the country has suffered terrorism or not. The subject is 
also important from the view that FDI has a crucial impact on economic growth. This should make 
further studies on the subject welcomed.  
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A. Distribution between bombing and assassination 
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B. Allocation of terrorist attacks 
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C. Definition of terror groups 
 
France 
 
Group Definition 
Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) transnational 
Action Directe domestic 
African National Congress (South Africa) transnational 
Algerian Moslem Fundamentalists transnational 
Anti-Armenian Organization domestic 
Anti-Nuclear extremists transnational 
Anti-Terrorist Liberation Group (GAL) domestic 
Arab Revolutionary Front domestic 
Argentine Anti-Communist Alliance (AAA) transnational 
Armata Corsa domestic 
Armata di Liberazione Naziunale (ALN) domestic 
Armed Islamic Group (GIA) transnational 
Armed Nucleus for Popular Autonomy domestic 
Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia transnational 
Association Totalement Anti-Guerre (ATAG) domestic 
Autonomous Revolutionary Brigade domestic 
Baader-Meinhof Group transnational 
Basque Fatherland and Freedom (ETA) transnational 
Basque Rectitudes domestic 
Black War domestic 
Breton Liberation Front (FLB) domestic 
Breton Separatists domestic 
Charles Martel Group domestic 
Clandestini Corsi domestic 
Comite d'Action Viticol domestic 
Commandos domestic 
Commandos Against Self Destruction of the Universe domestic 
Commandos of France domestic 
Committee of action against bull fights domestic 
Committee of Solidarity with Arab and Middle East Political Prisoners (CSPPA) domestic 
Communist Anti-Nuclear Front domestic 
Coordination for Revolutionary Action (CAR) domestic 
Corsican Farmers' Front domestic 
Corsican National Liberation Front (FLNC) domestic 
Corsican Nationalists domestic 
Corsican Revolutionary Brigade domestic 
Corsican Separatists domestic 
Delta Group domestic 
Falangist Security Group domestic 
Fanatical Ecologists domestic 
First of October Antifascist Resistance Group (GRAPO) transnational 
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France's Honour domestic 
Francia domestic 
French Basque Nationalists domestic 
French Liberation Front domestic 
Front for the Liberation of Lebanon from Foreigners domestic 
Front of French National Liberation domestic 
Gracchus Babeuf domestic 
Guadeloupe Liberation Army transnational 
Guerrillas domestic 
Hezbollah transnational 
Honour of the Police domestic 
Indipendenza domestic 
Internal Front domestic 
International Revolutionary Action Group (GARI) domestic 
International Revolutionary Solidarity domestic 
Iparretarrak (IK) domestic 
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) transnational 
Jacques de Molay Group domestic 
January 22 domestic 
Jihadi-inspired extremists transnational 
Justice Commandos for the Armenian Genocide transnational 
Katsuhisa Omori domestic 
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) transnational 
Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction (LARF) transnational 
M-5 domestic 
Martyrs of Baalbek domestic 
Militant Zionist Resistance Movement transnational 
Military Council for the True Liberation of Albania transnational 
Movement for the Supremacy of Reason domestic 
Muslim Extremists transnational 
National Movement Against the Mahgreb Invasion domestic 
Nationalist Intervention Group domestic 
Neo-Nazi extremists transnational 
New Armenian Resistance transnational 
New Caledonian independence supporters transnational 
Organization for the Liberation of France from Jewish Occupation domestic 
Orly Organization domestic 
Pacifist and Ecologist Committee domestic 
Palestinians transnational 
Partisan Sharpshooters domestic 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) transnational 
Portuguese Liberation Army transnational 
Pro-Palestinian Group transnational 
Rebels domestic 
Resistenza domestic 
Resistenza Corsa domestic 
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Revolutionary Anarchist Armed Terrorist Movement domestic 
Revolutionary Nationalist Movement domestic 
Right-wing extremists domestic 
Secessionists domestic 
Self-Defence Against All Authority domestic 
Separatists domestic 
Sixth of March Group domestic 
Solidarist Resistance Movement domestic 
Supporters of Right and Freedom domestic 
Survivors of Golfech domestic 
Turks transnational 
Ukrainian nationalists transnational 
United Liberation Front for the New Algeria transnational 
Youth Action Group domestic 
    
 
 
Spain 
 
Group Definition 
28th of December Group domestic 
Abd al-Krim Commandos domestic 
AGEL domestic 
Anti-Clerical Pro-Sex Toys Group domestic 
Anti-Independence Extremists domestic 
Anti-Terrorism ETA (ATE) transnational 
Anti-Terrorist Liberation Group (GAL) transnational 
Argentine Anti-communist Alliance (AAA) transnational 
Armed Groups for Communism domestic 
Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia transnational 
Autonomous Anti-Capitalist Commandos (CAA) domestic 
Basque Country Autonomous Self-Defence Group domestic 
Basque Extremists domestic 
Basque Fatherland and Freedom (ETA) domestic 
Basque Separatists domestic 
Basque Terrorists domestic 
Canary Islands Independence Movement domestic 
Catalan Liberation Front (FAC) domestic 
Commando Adolph Hitler transnational 
Coordination of the United Revolutionary Organization (CORU) transnational 
East Timorese Extremists transnational 
Fatah Uprising transnational 
First of October Antifascist Resistance Group (GRAPO) domestic 
Force 17 transnational 
Fuerza Nueva domestic 
Guerilla Party of the Galician Poor domestic 
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Guerrillas of Christ the King domestic 
International Anti-Communist Intelligence Service domestic 
Jarrai domestic 
Justice Commandos for the Armenian Genocide transnational 
Mateo Morral Insurrectionist Commandos domestic 
Neo-Fascists transnational 
Neo-Nazi extremists transnational 
Polisario Front transnational 
Red Army for the Liberation of Catalonia domestic 
Republican Anticlerical Group domestic 
Resistance Group domestic 
Resistencia Galega domestic 
Revolutionary Patriotic Anti-Fascist Front (FRAP) transnational 
Right-wing extremists domestic 
Right-Wing Group domestic 
Spanish Armed Group domestic 
Spanish Basque Battalion (BBE) (rightist) domestic 
Terra Lliure domestic 
Three Stars Autonomous Commando domestic 
Young Brigade of Navarro domestic 
Youths domestic 
		 		
 
 
The United Kingdom 
 
Group Definition 
Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades transnational 
Angry Brigade domestic 
Animal liberation Front (ALF) domestic 
Animal rights extremists  transnational 
Animal Rights Militia domestic 
Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia transnational 
Catholic Reaction Force  domestic 
Combat 18 domestic 
Continuity Irish Republicans Army (CIRA) domestic 
Direct Action Against Drugs domestic 
Dissident Republicans domestic 
Guardians of the Islamic Revolution domestic 
Guerrillas domestic 
Informal anarchist federation transnational 
Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) domestic 
Irish People's Liberation Organisation (IPLO) domestic 
Irish republican Extremists domestic 
Justice Commandos for the Armenian Genocide transnational 
Libyan Students transnational 
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Loyalists domestic 
Loyalists Volounteer Force (LVF) domestic 
May 15 Organization for the Liberation of Palestine domestic 
Meibion Glyndw domestic 
Neo-Nazi Extremists transnational 
Official Irish Republican Army (OIRA) domestic 
Oglaigh na hEireann domestic 
Orange Volunteers (OV) domestic 
Palestinians transnational 
Prison Action Force domestic 
Protestant action group domestic 
Protestant extremists transnational 
Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA) domestic 
Real Ulster Freedom Fighters domestic 
Red Hand Defenders domestic 
Republican Action Against Drugs domestic 
Scottish National Liberation Army domestic 
Secret Organization of al-Qaida in Europe domestic 
Supporters of Johnny Adair domestic 
Supporters of Quadafi transnational 
The Irish Volunteers domestic 
The New Irish republican army domestic 
Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) domestic 
White Extremists transnational 
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D. VAR analysis 
 
Significant results of Granger Causality test 
 
Causality   Significance 
FDI and terrorism   
France 
  FDI → total terrorism 5% 
FDI → national terrorism 5% 
   Spain 
  FDI → total terrorism 10% 
FDI ← total terrorism 10% 
FDI → national terrorism 10% 
FDI ← national terrorism 10% 
   Within terror 
  The United Kingdom 
  national terror  → total terror 5% 
total terror → transnational teror 5% 
national terror → transnational terror 1% 
      
 
 
Lag Length Criteria 
 
France 
 
 
 
Spain 
 
 
 
 
 
	Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ
0 -1590.573 NA	 	5.34e+32 	83.87224 		84.00152* 		83.91824*
1 -1582.375 	14.67008 	5.59e+32 	83.91445 	84.43159 	84.09844
2 -1577.307 	8.268617 	6.94e+32 	84.12141 	85.02639 	84.44339
3 -1561.739 		22.94140* 		5.04e+32* 		83.77576* 	85.06859 	84.23574
	Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ
0 -1585.431 NA	 	4.08e+32 	83.60164 	83.73092 	83.64764
1 -1548.050 	66.89315 	9.17e+31 	82.10788 		82.62501* 	82.29187
2 -1535.378 	20.67406 	7.64e+31 	81.91466 	82.81964 	82.23664
3 -1518.424 		24.98566* 		5.16e+31* 		81.49600* 	82.78883 		81.95598*
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The United Kingdom 
 
 
 	
	Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ
0 -1640.167 NA	 	7.27e+33 	86.48249 	86.61178 	86.52849
1 -1618.289 		39.15055* 		3.70e+33* 		85.80469* 		86.32182* 		85.98868*
2 -1614.451 	6.262500 	4.90e+33 	86.07636 	86.98134 	86.39834
3 -1611.026 	5.046371 	6.75e+33 	86.36982 	87.66265 	86.82980
